Abstract. We analyze an independent private values model where a number of objects are sold in sequential first-and second-price auctions. Bidders have unit demand and their valuation for an object is decreasing in the rank number of the auction in which it is sold. We derive efficient equilibria if prices are announced after each auction or if no information is given to bidders. We show that the sequence of prices constitutes a supermartingale. Even if we correct for the decrease in valuations for objects sold in later auctions we find that average prices are declining. JEL Classification numbers: D82, D44.
Introduction
If multiple objects are sold in auctions, this is often done sequentially -one object after the other. In this paper we focus on situations where bidders have unit demands and their valuation for an object declines with the rank number of the auction it is sold. This is the case if otherwise identical objects become available at different points in time and bidders prefer to receive an object early. Examples are auctions of goods on a rental basis where one object is available to one buyer at a time (like vacation Int J Game Theory (2004) accommodation, cars, tractors or DVD's) or fish auctions, where the fish is auctioned when it arrives at the port. In addition, our analysis applies to situations where the objects are physically different and the more valuable objects are sold in earlier auctions. This is the case for art auctions as reported by Beggs and Graddy (1997) . Other prominent examples are rightto-choose auctions where the winner can choose one object from the pool of objects that are for sale. We find that (expected) discounted prices decline in sequential first-or second-price (sealed bid) auctions. Furthermore, we show that conditional on the current price, the expected discounted price in any future period is below the current price. In other words: the stochastic process that governs the price development is a supermartingale. The intuition supporting these results is as follows: If discounted equilibrium prices remained constant, a bidder's expected utility from winning would decline (since valuation and price decline at the same rate). Since the probability of winning in a given period is not affected by the devaluation, the (non-conditional) expected utility would decline as well. This means that bidders can do better by increasing their bids in earlier periods, thereby deviating from the putative equilibrium. If valuations decline by a constant discount factor, we demonstrate that prices can decline substantially faster relative to valuations. Hence our results can offer an explanation for declining prices even in settings with high discount factors.
Another finding of our analysis concerns the information policy of the seller. We analyze the price dynamics for two different information structures. Under the first no information is revealed between periods. Under the second the seller announces after each period the price paid in that period. We show that both information structures yield efficient equilibria.
By using a revenue equivalence approach we argue that the same price dynamics hold for other sequential bidding mechanisms and information structures. Specifically, we show that any two sequential mechanisms which are efficient and in which information is revealed only about bidders who already quit the auction, yield the same price dynamics. In addition, the sequential formats are revenue equivalent to a Vickrey auction, where all objects are sold at the same time within one auction (and buyers have to wait after the auction until the objects become available). Hence, choosing a sequential format will not reduce the seller's revenue or create inefficiencies. What matters in terms of revenue is not whether the auctions are sequential or simultaneous but whether the goods are available to all buyers instantaneously. 1 We also show how our model translates to situations where the objects for sale are identical but bidders are uncertain about the continuation of the auction process.
Weber (1983) and Milgrom and Weber (2000) assume constant valuations across periods and show that expected prices stay constant. These papers analyze bidding behavior in first-and second-price auctions with and without
